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NOTES
GATLIN OIL CO. V. UNITED STATES: A MYOPIC VIEW OF OPA
LIABILITY
Under the cover of darkness on March 13, 1994, a vandal opened
the fuel tanks on the premises of Gatlin Oil Company, a small fuel
distribution business located in rural North Carolina.' The inci-
dent led to the discharge of approximately 20,000-30,000 gallons
of oil.2 Unfortunately, thousands of gallons reached ditches near a
navigable river, a fire raged for several hours, and some of the oil
reached the navigable river.3
The threat of an oil discharge into the navigable waterway,
combined with the actual discharge of oil into the waterway,
subjected the facility owner to the provisions of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (OPA or Act).4 A North Carolina District Court, basing
its holding on the language of the OPA, awarded Gatlin compen-
sation from the OPA Trust Fund for its costs associated with the
spill cleanup; the court found that Gatlin was not responsible for
the incident.5
In Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, the Fourth Circuit vacated the
district court holding. The appellate court took a much narrower
view of recoverable costs than the one urged by Gatlin Oil and
accepted by the district court, severely restricting the definition
of qualifying damages under the Act. On the surface, the decision
1. See BriefofGatlin Oil Co. at 3, Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir.
1999) (No. 97-2079).
2. See Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 209.
3. See id.
4. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 209.
5. See Order at 11-12, Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 207 (No. 97-2079), in Joint Appendix at 327-
28, Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 207 (No. 97-2079).
6. 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999).
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appears to be consistent with one of the stated purposes of OPA:
increasing the financial responsibility of a polluting party.7 A
survey of the Act's language, legislative history, and OPA liability
holdings, however, supports the conclusion that the Fourth Circuit
engaged in an unsupportable analysis of OPA's liability scheme.
This Note suggests that the majority's interpretation of the OPA
in Gatlin was inconsistent with the language and intent of the Act.
To demonstrate this, the Note first briefly describes the history of
some of the relevant oil pollution statutes that existed prior to the
enactment of OPA and the circumstances surrounding the passage
of the Act. The Note outlines the relevant portions of OPA and then
summarizes the Fourth Circuit's holding. The Note evaluates the
statute to demonstrate that the Fourth Circuit's holding was not
consistent with the plain language of the text or with the legislative
intent of the Act. A review of prior OPA liability holdings further
reveals that Gatlin is inconsistent with the established inter-
pretations of the statute, and, indeed, ultimately limits liability
through a provision designed to expand liability of polluting parties.
Finally, the Note recommends that courts employ a consistently
broad interpretation of the Act's liability provisions. A court at-
tempting to limit compensation from the Trust Fund should focus
on the defense to liability provisions within the OPA.
HISTORY OF RELEVANT U.S. OIL POLLUTION LAWS
Prior to the enactment of the OPA, numerous disjointed federal
statutes governed oil spill liability, creating a "patchwork" of legis-
lation that often proved to be confusing and ineffectual.8 Because
7. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723 (noting
that the inability of victims to claim compensation from responsible parties constituted a
problem with federal law prior to OPA).
8. See J.B. Ruhl & Michael J. Jewell, Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Opening A New Era in
Federal and Texas Regulation of Oil Spill Prevention, Containment and Cleanup, and
Liability, 32 S. TEx. L. REV. 475, 480 (1991). The mere fact that liability prior to OPA was
based on a "patchwork7 of legislation is not sufficient to conclude automatically that the
legislation was ineffective. The common perception, however, is that pre-OPA legislation
failed even in the "patchwork" of coverage it did provide. See id. at 480-81; see also S. REP.
No. 101-94, at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. at 724 ("Under existing Federallaw, atleast
five statutes deal with the issue of oil spill liability and compensation. Each is different, and
each is inadequate.").
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these federal laws formed the backdrop against which the OPA
was enacted, a brief summary of the pre-OPA laws in existence is
warranted.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19729
(FWPCA) provided an important oil pollution provision in section
311.10 One of the important features of section 311 is that it allowed
for an absolute defense to liability if a polluting party could show
that a discharge resulting in pollution was caused by an act of God,
an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party." Unlike the
OPA, section 311 provided a fourth defense to liability: negligence
on behalf of the United States.' The nearly identical formulation
of defenses under the FWPCA and OPA makes judicial inter-
pretation of defenses under FWPCA a good source of interpretation
for OPA liability defense cases.'" Another noteworthy feature of the
Act is that it established a 35 million dollar Trust Fund to assist in
administration, recovery, and removal costs associated with an oil
spill. Years later OPA would follow this model. 4
Prior to the enactment of OPA, Congress passed three important
Acts to supplement section 311 of the FWPCA: the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 (TAPAA),' 5 the Deepwater Port
9. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). The FWPCA is commonly known as the Clean Water Act
(CWA).
10. See 33 U.S.C. §.1321.
11. See id. § 1321(f).
12. See id.
13. See MICHAEL M. GIBSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF PETROLEUM SPILLS AND
WASTES § 4.6, at 88 (1993) (noting that FWPCA and OPA defenses to liability are practically
identical" and that case law under the FWPCA"likely will control the interpretation of these
defenses under the OPA"). Numerous definitions within OPA are taken directly from
FWPCA, and the liability section of the OPA cross-references section 311 of the FWPCA,
further indicating the interrelationship of these two Acts. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1); S. REP.
No. 101-94, at 102, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 780.
14. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(kXl), repealed by OilPollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380,
§2002(b)(2), 104 Stat. 507 (1990).
15. Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656
(1994)).
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Act of 1974 (DWPA),'6 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978 (OCLSA). 17
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act
TAAPA provided a strict liability scheme for vessels carrying oil
transported via the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and loaded at the
pipeline terminal facility.18 The Act capped a vessel's absolute
liability for a spill at 100 million dollars and created a Trust Fund
to pay the balance of uncompensated claims up to that limit.'
TAAPA, similar to FWPCA, provided for specifically enumerated
defenses to liability.20
Deepwater Port Act
DWPA provided liability for an oil discharge "from a vessel
within any safety zone, from a vessel which has received oil from
another vessel at a deepwater port, or from a deepwater port."21
The Act limited liability for discharges and also provided for
enumerated defenses to liability.22
16. Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (1974) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524
(1994)).
17. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1866
(1994)).
18. See 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1)-(2).
19. See id § 1356(c)(3), (5).
20. See id. § 1653(c)(1)-(2). The Act did not provide a defense against liability for an act
of God. See id. Under the current version of section 1653, all of subsection c will be repealed
60 days after the Comptroller General certifies to Congress that all claims arising under the
subsection have been resolved, all actions for recovery under the subsection are resolved, and
all "reasonably necessary" expenses to implement subsection c have been resolved. The
current annotated supplement of this Act contains subsection c, so presumably the provisions
for repeal have yet to be met. See id. § 1653(c) (West Supp. 2000). The OPA would now cover
a tanker spill within Alaskan waters.
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(a) (1975), repealed by OilPollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380,
Title H, § 2003(a)(2), 104 Stat. 507 (1990). Under the Act, a deepwater port refers to "floating
manmade strubtures... located beyond the territorial sea and off the coast of the United
States and which are used or intended for use as a port or terminal for the... handling of
oil for transportation to any State." Id. § 1502(10) (1994).
22. See id. § 1517(b), (g) (repealed 1990).
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Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments
The OCSLA Amendments of 1978 provided for joint, several, or
strict liability for oil pollution, or threat of oil pollution, from a
vessel" (not including a vessel owned, chartered, or operated bythe
United States)2 or an offshore facility25 covered under the Act.26
The Amendments also established defenses to liability2 7 and a
Compensation Trust Fund.'
Along with the patchwork of Acts enacted to supplement the
FWPCA, an antiquated Act remained (and still remains) in the U.S.
Code that serves to limit liability of polluting vessels. The
Limitation of Liability Act of 185129 (1851 Act) restricts the liability
of sea-going vessels for a variety of incidents, including maritime
accidents. At the time of passage of the 1851 Act, it served to
stimulate growth in both shipbuilding and the employment of
ships. 3 0 An important feature of the 1851 Act was that it could be
invoked to limit the liability of vessels involved in accidents to "the
amount or yalue of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and
her freight then pending." 1 This effectively allowed owners of
vessels lost in an accident to invoke the 1851 Act to escape most, if
not all, of the financial liability of the accident. 2 Although the 1851
Act is not applicable under the FWPCA, 3 at least two courts held
that in federal cases in which an owner invoked the limitation to
23. A vessel was defined as watercraft that operated in the waters above the Outer
Continental Shelf. See 43 U.S.C. § 1811(5) (1988), repealed by OilPollutionAct of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-380, § 2004, 104 Stat. 507 (1990). For the purposes of OSCLA, the Outer
Continental Shelfmeant "all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands
beneath navigable waters." Id. § 1331(a) (1994).
24. See id. §§ 1811(6), 1814(a) (repealed 1990).
25. An offshore facility was defined as apparatus used to drill, produce, handle, etc. oil
produced from the Outer Continental Shelf. See id. § 1811(8) (repealed 1990).
26. See id. § 1814(a) (repealed 1990).
27. See id. § 1814(c) (repealed 1990).
28. See id. § 1812 (repealed 1990).
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (now codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-96
(1994)).
30. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 725.
31. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a) (1994).
32. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 4. There is no "value" to a ship and cargo lost at sea, and
therefore no basis of liability under the Act. See id.
33. See THoMASJ. ScHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTYAND MARITIME LAW § 16-2, at 836 n.27 (2d
ed. 1994).
18972001]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
liability under the 1851 Act, the 1851 Act could be invoked to limit
oil pollution liability under applicable state laws, even in a strict
liability regime."'
Against the backdrop ofthis "patchwork" of oil pollution laws, the
Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker bound for Long Beach, California,
collided with a reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound on March 24,
1989."' The ecological impact of the spill proved to be disastrous: 11
million gallons of oil spread into the sound.3" Oil company officials
failed to take measures to contain the spill in the first hours after
the accident, further compounding the effects of the spill."
Unfortunately, the "patchwork" of oil pollution laws in existence
at the time of the spill could have been grossly inadequate for such
a disaster.38-For example, if the spill had occurred off the coast of
New Jersey, the government would have had access to only the 35
million dollar Trust Fund available under FWPCA to assist in
cleanup operations, rather than the 100 million Trust Fund that
was available under TAAPA.39 With 80 to 91 million gallons spilled
in U.S. waters between 1980 and 1986 alone, available resources
for cleanup literally depended on the factual fortuity of where the
spill occurred. In the wake of "the nation's largest oil spill" and
other similar spills closely following the Exxon incident,"1 Congress
34. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 4; SCHOENEAUM, supra note 33, at 836 n.27.
35. See Maura Dolan & Ronald B. Taylor, Alaska Oil Spill May Be Largest in U.S.
Waters, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1989, at 1.
36. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 2.
37. See Dolan & Taylor, supra note 35, at 1 (quoting a professor at the University of
Alaska who quipped that tlhere (was) no oil (cleanup equipment) out there, and it's been
14 hours"(alterations in original)); Timothy Egan, Exxon. Oil Spill Out of Control, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Mar. 31,1989, at 9, available in 1989 WL 7737017 ("Oil company officials
... acknowledged they did not begin to deploy cleanup booms around the ship until 10 hours
after the accident-five hours past the deadline demanded by the contingency plan they are
required to follow.").
38. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
39. See Daniel Kopec & H. Philip Peterson, Note, Crude Legislation: Liability and
Compensation Under The Oil Pollution Act of 1990,23 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 617-18 (1992).
40. See WIILIAm H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.9, at 376 (2d ed.1994). For
an example of a large post-OPA spill, see Oil Spill Closes Stretch of Mississippi, WASH. POST,
Nov. 30, 2000, at A16 (discussing 554,000 gallon crude-oil spill in the Mississippi following
the grounding of a tanker).
41. S. REP. No. 101-94, at 2.
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unanimously passed the Oil Pollution Act of 199042 to eliminate the
pre-OPA "patchwork" liability scheme. 43 OPA's liability provisions
were intended to accomplish this goal."
OPA PROVISIONS
OPA's liability scheme is succinctly contained in section 2702 of
the Act:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
to the provisions of this Act, each responsible party for a vessel
or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the
substantial threat of a discharge of off, into or upon the
navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive
economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages
specified in subsection (b) of this section that result from such
incident.45
42. See Thomas J. Wagner, Recoverable Damages Under The Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 283, 285 (1993) (noting the unanimous votes for the passage of OPA).
Despite the unanimous passage of the bill, President Bush, when he signed the bill into law
on August 18, 1990, criticized a provision that required a moratorium on drilling off the
North Carolina coast. See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 1465,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 861-1.
43. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Conewago Contractors, Inc., No. 4:CV-93-1995, 1994
U.S. Dist. Lexis 104070, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22,1994) ('Invoicing their support for the bill,
legislators emphasized the importance of protecting the oceans and the United States
coastline from oil spills, and stressed, above all, the need for preventive measures and for
immediate, effective, responsive action in event of a spill.").
45. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994). Subsection (b) deals with removal costs and damages
under the Act. See infra notes 47-48.
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Definitions pertaining to the Act are detailed in section
2701,including"responsible party,"' "damages,"47 "removal costs,'
and "incident."49
If enumerated defenses are met,50 section 2702 also allows a
responsible party to shift liability to a third party and to seek
subrogation to the rights of the United States to collect from third
parties for payments made by the responsible party.5 ' OPA also
supersedes the Limited Liability Act of 1851 and does not limit
liability for oil discharges under either federal or state liability
52regimes.
Defenses to Liability
Section 2703 allows a responsible party to avoid liability for
removal costs and damages if that party successfully establishes the
discharge of oil, or substantial threat of discharge, was caused by
an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party.'
A party who fails to report the incident, cooperate with officials in
46. Responsible parties include the owners and operators ofvessels and onshore facilities.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A)-(B). An onshore facility is one or more structures, pieces of
equipment, or devices used to drill, produce, store, handle, transfer, process, or transport oil
and located on, or under, any land with the United States other than submerged land. See
id. § 2701(9), (24).
47. Damages include: "Damages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from
destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns
or leases that property." Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B). Loss of profits and revenues, as well as damages
to natural resources are also covered under the definition. See id. § 2703(bX2)(A), (C)-(E).
Damages also "includes the cost of assessing these damages." Id. § 2701(5).
48. Removal costs are defined as "the costs ofremoval that are incurred after a discharge
of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial threat of a discharge of oil,
the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from such an incident." Id §
2701(31).
49. The definition of "incident," which was at issue in Gatlin, is as follows: "'incident'
means any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, involving one or more
vessels, facilities, or any combination thereof, resulting inthe discharge or substantial threat
of discharge of oil."Id. § 2701(14).
50. See id. § 2702(d)(1XA). For a discussion of the enumerated defenses, see infra text
accompanying note 53.
51. See id. § 2702(d)(1)(B).
52. See id. § 2718(c).
53. See id. § 2703(aXl)-(3).
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removal activities, or to follow enumerated procedures within the
FWPCA loses the available defenses under the section.54
Section 2704 provides limitations on the liability of responsible
parties, as well as third parties found liable under section 2703."5
Total liability for tank vessels responsible under the Act is capped
at the greater of $1200 per gross ton, or $10,000,000 for vessels over
3000 tons, or $2,000,000 for vessels under 3000 tons.56 An onshore
facility faces liability up to $350,000,000.57
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
Section 2708 allows a responsible party which successfully
asserts a defense under section 2703 or which has paid the
maximum liability under section 2704 to "assert a claim [against
the Trust Fund] for removal costs and damages."" Section 2712
expressly makes the fund available to the President for the
payment of claims for uncompensated removal costs that are
consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), or for
uncompensated damages. 9 The procedure for making these claims
is provided in section 2713.60 The Trust Fund is financed with a five
cent per-barrel tax on petroleum products received at a U.S.
54. See id. § 2703(c).
55. See id. § 2704(a); see, e.g., National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-
Atlantic Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1453 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding that, despite the fact that
an off spill from plaintiffs vessel in a maritime collision was caused completely by the
negligence of the defendant, the OPA capped the amount that plaintiff could collect from
defendant for its cleanup expenses).
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1).
57. See id. § 2704(a)(4). Another aspect of OPAis that Congress also adopted legislation
requiring oil tankers operating in U.S. waters to have double hulls. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703a
(1994 & Supp. 1998). Many ships will not have to comply before January 1, 2015, see id.,
leaving U.S. waters vulnerable to catastrophic spills similar to that of the Valdez. See, e.g.,
John Biers & Keith Darce, Industry.wide reluctance to replace older oil tanks with newer,
safer vessels is spotlighted in wake of Tuesday's massive oil spill, TIMFS-PICAYUNE, Dec. 3,
2000, at MONEY pg. 1 (noting that with pre-OPA single-hull vessels, "[t]he only thing
separating thousands ofbarrels ofoil fromprecious wetlands and wildlife [is] a layer of steel
less than an inch thick").
58. 33 U.S.C. § 2708(a).
59. See id § 2712(a)(1)(4). The Fund is available for numerous other uses, none of which
were at issue in Gatlin.
60. See id. § 2713.
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refinery or that enter into the United States for consumption, use,
or storage.61
GATLIN OIL V. UNITED STATES
When a vandal opened seven of Gatlin Oil's above-ground fuel
tanks, discharging 20,000-30,000 gallons of oil, some of which ran
into a river located near the property,62 Gatlin Oil became subject
to the strict-liability provisions of the OPA. Along with the
significant discharge of oil, the vapors ignited, causing significant
damage to Gatlin's property.63 The Coast Guard designated Gatlin
as a responsible party under OPA and directed the company to
undertake cleanup operations."
Gatlin successfully claimed a complete defense to liability under
the OPA and sought compensation from the Trust Fund for
damages to its property and removal costs associated with the
cleanup operations.65 Although a North Carolina district court
granted Gatlin compensation from the OPA Trust Fund, the Fourth
Circuit vacated the holding and awarded Gatlin only the costs
associated with the cleanup operations designated by the On-Scene
Coordinator; it disallowed all other claims brought by Gatlin.66
In disallowing the claim for compensation, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the Coast Guard's (the "agency") interpretation of OPA
liability and compensation provisions.67 The majority determined
that the language of the statute was ambiguous. Citing the Chevron
61. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611(a)(2),(c)(2)(B) (1994).The Trust Fundisestablishedinanother
section of the the Internal Revenue Code. See id § 9509.
62. See Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207,209 (4th Cir. 1999).
63. See id. The fire destroyed a bulk plant, warehouse, inventory, a loading dock,
numerous vehicles, and also consumed much of the discharged oil. See id.
64. See id. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator, dispatched bythe Coast Guard, directed
Gatlin to remove approximately 5500 gallons of oil from storm ditches and surface water to
prevent further discharge of oil into the local river, itwas determined that 10 gallons of fuel
actually reached the river. See id.
65. See id. at 210. Gatlin sought to recover $850,000 plus interest from the Trust Fund.
Both the majority and dissent agreed that Gatlin could not collect an award of interest from
the United States. See id. at 210-14. The company also sought reimbursement for removal
costs associated with directives given by federal and state officials, and the court disallowed
reimbursement for cleanup operations designated by the latter. See id. at 212-13; infra text
accompanying note 181.
66. See Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 212-14.
67. See id.
1902 [Vol. 42:1893
20011 A MYOPIC VIEW OF OPA LIABILITY 1903
doctrine, it adopted the agency's interpretations because they were
"grammatically correct and... accommodate[d] the purpose of the
Act."6" The first step a court must take under Chevron is to
determine whether Congress has spoken on the contested issue.
Pursuant to this doctrine, Gatlin began its analysis by examining
the text of the OPA. Interestingly, in reaching its decision to limit
Gatlin Oil's recovery, the court took a narrow view of the liability
provision of the Act. The argument was essentially that any
compensable "removal costs" or "damages" under the Act must be
a direct result of an oil spill into navigable waters or the adjacent
shoreline, or a substantial threat of such a spill.69 This reasoning is
based on text of the Act, which states that liability for an oil spill
ensues for damages "that result from such incident"; the court noted
that the "antecedent of 'such incident' is the discharge or
substantial threat of discharge into navigable waters or adjacent
shorelines."7" The court found that because the fire damage to
68. IL at 211. The Chevron doctrine, enumerated in Chevron U.S. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is a test used by courts to determine
whether to adopt an executive agency's interpretation of a federal statute. See, e.g., Kootenai
Elec. Coop. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 1999 WL 798064, at *4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
A court determines whether to give deference to the agency through the use of a two-part
test: it must first determine if Congress has spoken directly on the disputed issue; if
Congressional intent on the issue is clear, "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also
Walton v. Hammons, 1999 WL 731729, at *12 (6th Cir. 1999) (disregarding agency
interpretation of statute and noting that"Chevron deference [was] not appropriate" because
it went against the clear meaning of the statute).
If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the disputed issue, the court determines whether
the agency interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843. Of course, there is often controversy over what constitutes a permissible
agency construction of a statute. Compare, e.g., Credit Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 86
F.3d 1326, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) ([Wle accord much less deference to an agency's
interpretations of a statute that conflict with the agency's previous interpretations of that
same statute."), and Wise v. Ruffin, 914 F.2d 570,580 (4th Cir. 1990) (same), with Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference toAdministrative Interpretations ofLaw, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517
(1989) ("MiThere is no longer any justification for giving'special' deference to 'long-standing
and consistent' agency interpretations of law... [or] for holding an agency to its first answer,
[and] penalizing it for a change of mind.").
69. Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 210-11. The court reasoned that the language of the liability
provision, section 2702(a), limited the broad definition of "incident" given in the definition
section of the Act, section 2701(14). For the language of the provisions in question, see supra
notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
70. Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 210-11. The court accepted the government's position that the
broad definition of "incident" in the Act was narrowed by the language "such incident" in
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Gatlin's property did not constitute a threat of discharge of oil into
navigable waters or the adjacent shoreline, Gatlin could not receive
compensation for these damages from the Trust Fund.7
Although discounted by the Coast Guard and, ultimately, the
Fourth Circuit majority, the definition of "incident" given in section
2701(14)72 indicates an expansive interpretation of the word to be
used "[flor the purposes of th[e] [OPAl Act."73 A principal inter-
pretative problem is whether the reference in section 2702 to "such
incident" significantly modifies the broad definition given to
"incident" in section 2701. A review of the Act and its legislative
history indicates that Gatlin ultimately strains to interpret the
statute in such a way as to deny compensation for Gatlin Oil's
property damage.
In its statutory construction, the Coast Guard, and consequently
the Fourth Circuit, placed too much emphasis on the word "such"
when it utilized two dictionaries to demonstrate how the word
modified "incident." As noted in United States v. Conoco, Inc.,7' "[iun
construing a statute, the court is 'guided not by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but [must] look to the provisions of the whole
law, and to its object and policy."'7 Furthermore, in Union
Petroleum Corp. v. United States,76 a court reviewing liability under
FWPCA, a precursor to OPA, opined that courts should avoid a
"hypertechnical approach' to the statutory definitions of the
[FWPCA] Act that would be 'likely to delay cleanup operations
section 2702, which rendered the text ambiguous and therefore the agency interpretation
dictated under Chevron. See Brief for Appellants U.S. Department of Transportation at 26-
27, Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 207 (No. 97-2079).
71. See Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 210-11.
72. See supra note 49.
73. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
74. 916 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. La. 1996). The court in Conoco dealt with the issue ofwhether
Coast Guard monitoring costs are recoverable under the OPA liability provisions. See infra
notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
75. Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 583 (quoting Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S.
26 (1990)); see also United States v. Bois D' Arc Operating Corp., No. 98-157, 1999 WL
130635, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 10, 1999) (quoting the same passage). Conoco and Bois D'Arc
quoted this passage in holdings that read OPA liability expansively. See also Cass 1.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 420 (1989)
("[C]ourts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those words
import a policy that goes beyond them." (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
76. 651 F.2d 734 (Ct. CL 1981).
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while arguing over the responsibility.'"" This is particularly
instructive because the court in Petroleum Oil faced an analogous
issue to the one present in Gatlin.
In Petroleum Oil, vandals opened valves on two railroad tank
cars during a labor strike, resulting in the discharge of
approximately 60,000 gallons of oil.78 Some of the oil reached a
nearby- creek, triggering the provisions of the FWPCA. Petroleum
Oil undertook cleanup operations and then sought compensation
under the FWPCA.7 ' The issue facing the court was whether the
railroad cars involved in the litigation qualified under the Act's
definition of "onshore facility"; if not, the plaintiff would fail to
qualify for compensation under the Act.
The court chose to interpret "onshore facility" broadly and
specifically declined to find that "the tank cars can be properly
regarded as a facility wholly segregable from the storage and
distribution facility plaintiff operated." 0 Rather than find that the
storage and distribution facilities constituted the entire "onshore
facility" under the Act (thus excluding the tank cars), the court
utilized a broader definition of the term in order to comport with
"[tihe clearly expressed overall policy embodied in the Act."8" Just
as in Gatlin, Petroleum Oil had to be found responsible for the spill
in order to qualify for a defense under the Act.
In light of the congressional intent that the FWPCA provide the
framework for OPA,"2 and specific references to the Act within the
77. Id. at 744. As noted above, FWPCA cases provide useful precedent for issues arising
under the OPA. See supra note 13. Gatlin initially disputed his liability under the Act,
refusing to cooperate with federal officials. See infra note 173.
78. See Union Petroleum Corp., 651 F.2d at 736.
79. See id Although disputed by the parties, the Coast Guard apparently designated
Petroleum Oil as the responsible party for the spill; the total cost of Petroleum Oil's efforts
amounted to $99,952.17. See id at 741.
80. Id. at 743. It is significant that the court declined to sever the definition of facility
under the Act; the court noted that not reading the provision broadly "would... discourageimmediate cleanup operations whichis the main thrust ofthe Act."Id. For this same reason,
Gatlin should not have severed the definition of "incident" under the OPA. See text
accompanying notes 123-25.
81. Union Petroleum Corp., 651 F.2d at 743.
82. See S. REP. No. 101-94 at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.N. 722, 726 ("The
body of law already established under section 311 of the Clean Water Act is the foundation
of the reported bilL Many of that section's concepts and provisions are adopted directly or by
reference."); GIBSON, supra note 13, § 4.6, at 88.
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OPA,' the policy of a broad reading of the liability provisions under
the FWPCA should guide a court interpreting OPA provisions.
If the court in Petroleum Oil had read "onshore facility" narrowly,
a polluting party without a defense to liability could have used the
holding to escape liability. For example, had the court held that
railroad tank cars did not qualify as part of the plaintiffs facility,
a negligent railroad that polluted a waterway through the discharge
of oil from a tank car could have used the Petroleum Oil holding to
escape FWPCA liability. In essence, if railroad cars are not an
"onshore facility" under the Act, then a polluter does not fall within
the Act's provisions, thereby escaping liability.
This problem is highlighted in the Gatlin holding- a polluting
party that seeks to escape responsibility by arguing that not all of
its discharge is part of an OPA "incident" now has a holding with
which it can challenge its liability under the Act, a course of action
that may delay cleanup operations.84
A review of the broad OPA definitions given for "damages,""
"removal costs,"86 "responsible party,"" and "incident,""8 as well as
the statute's overruling of the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 for
OPA oil spills,89 all indicate that the statute's liability provisions
83. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
84. Of course, a delay in cleanup operations is exactly what Congress wanted to avoid.
See supra note 44. Interestingly, a party that fails to cooperate with officials loses its limits
on liability under the Act and therefore has incentive to cooperate rather than challenge
liability. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(cX2)(B) (1994) (disallowing limit on liability in event that
discharging party fails "to provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by
responsible official in connection with removal activities"). Gatlin initially challenged his
designation as the responsible party and delayed cleanup operations for several hours before
discussing the issue with his attorney and accepting responsibility. See Brief for Appellants
U.S. Department of Transportation at 7-8, Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207 (4th
Cir. 1999) (No. 97-2079). The point is that even a small amount of time that passes without
initiating cleanup operations can lead to a significant increase in the amount of oil
discharged, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, and courts should be consistent in
liability holdings so that no questions of liability exist when a spill does occur. Gatlin's initial
refusal to cooperate provided the court with a legitimate tool to deny the company's claim for
compensation. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 47.
86. See supra note 48.
87. See supra note 46.
88. See supra note 49.
89. See James L. Nicoll, Jr.,Marine Pollution and NaturalResource Damages: The Multi-
Million Dollar Damage Award and Beyond, 5 U.S.F. MA1?. L.J. 323, 328 (1993) (noting that
OPA's language "notwithstanding any other provision of law' in the limits on liability
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are intended to be read expansively. The history and backdrop
against which the Act was passed also support this conclusion.90
Even assuming that the statute is not clear on its face, the
Chevron doctrine indicates that a court may evaluate the legislative
history of an Act in an attempt to discern congressional intent
before accepting an agency's interpretation of that Act.91 A review
of the OPA legislative history is therefore warranted to demon-
strate that the court should not have adopted the Coast Guard's
interpretation of liability.
Congressional Intent
Although the government brief in Gatlin makes repeated
references to the significance of the word "such"92 in order to limit
the boundaries of "incident" in section 2702, the legislative history
indicates no congressional intent of such a narrow reading. For
example, the definition of "incident" in the legislative history
indicates congressional intent that the word be interpreted broadly:
provision (section 2704) indicates congressional intent to exempt OPA claims from the 1851
Act).
90. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text. The history surrounding an Act's
passage can be illuminating in supporting an interpretation of the text. See INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) ("The message conveyed by the plain language of the Act
is confirmed by an examination of its history.").
91. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
845 (1984) ("[W]e should not disturb [an agency's interpretation] unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accomodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned." (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Skinner, 367 U.S. 374,382 (1961))).
Of course, with Justice Scalia now on the Court, there is much debate about his "textualist"
influence on applications of the Chevron doctrine and to what extent this influence limits the
Court from utilizing legislative history in Chevron decisions. See generally Gregory E. Maggs,
Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 393 (1996) (defending Justice Scalia against critics who either claim Scalia defers too
much, or too little, under the Chevron doctrine); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the ChevronDoctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) (arguing that textualism, which
disfavors the use of legislative history, threatens the future of the Chevron doctrine).
Regardless of the extent of his influence on the Court, it has used legislative history to
undertake Chevron analyses since his arrival. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 695 (1995) ("Our consideration of the text
and structure of the Act, [and] its legislative history... persuades us that the Court of
Appeals'judgment should be reversed." (emphasis added)). Thus, legislative history appears
to be a legitimate tool of interpretation under the Chevron doctrine.
92. See Brieffor Appellants U.S. Department of Transportation at 24-29, Gatlin Oil Co.
v. United States, 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-2079).
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"'Incident' is defined to mean an occurrence or series of related
occurrences because, as under other Federal law it is the intent of
the Conferees that the entire series of events resulting in the spill of
oil comprises one 'incident."'9 As for the modifier "such," the
legislative history refers to "incident" with other modifiers. For
example, the report indicates that the liability section 2702 of the
OPA "creates a cause of action for removal costs and damages...
that result from an incident."9' In describing section 2703 defenses
to liability, the report notes that a defense is permissible if a party
can prove that "the incident" was caused by an act of God, war, or
third party.9" In other words, "incident" is given an extremely broad
definition in both the statute and legislative history, and nothing in
the legislative history indicates that so much weight should be
given to the modifier "such" in the liability provision.
In fact, two North Carolina Congressmen wrote letters to the
National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) on Gatlin's behalf,
indicating that his situation was exactly the type of situation
contemplated when the Oil Liability Trust Fund was established."
Congressman Walter B. Jones, Jr., the son of the House sponsor of
the OPA, wrote to the NPFC in 1996 and stated that "there is no
doubt in my mind that it was [Congress's] intention to include even
those who have been victimized by the spilling of their own oil
under circumstances beyond their control, and that such victims
were entitled to be compensated for the damages incurred."9"
93. S. REP. No. 101-94, at 102(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C-.AN. 722,780 (emphasis
added). This language proved to be persuasive to the district court, which quoted part of the
sentence in its order. See Order at 12, Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 207 (No. 97-2079); Joint Appendix
at 328, Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 207 (No. 97-2079). The Gatlin dissent did not refer to the
legislative history, but opined that the plain language of the statute supported the broad
reading of the liability provision espoused by the district court. See Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 207,
214.
94. S. REP. No. 101-94, at 103 (emphasis added).
95. See id. at 783 (emphasis added).
96. See Brief of Appellee Gatlin Oil Co. at 39, Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 207 (No. 97-2079). ("As
a Member of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which originated the
legislation that became the [OPAl, I believe that Congress set up the Fund to help in cases
such as this."(letter from Congressman H. Martin Lancaster, Oct. 12, 1994)).
97. Id.
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Although the views of specific legislators do not constitute
"legislative intent,""8 the letters certainly support the proposition
that Gatlin is a strained interpretation of the Act. In sum, the
statute's language and legislative history do not support the
interpretation espoused by the Coast Guard (and adopted by
Gatlin), and the court should not have adopted the agency's narrow
definition of recoverable costs.' Furthermore, a review of the
holdings in related OPA cases indicates that a strong consensus
exists that OPA liability provisions should be read broadly by the
judiciary.
Judicial Interpretation of OPA Liability
It is important to note that Gatlin's narrow interpretation of
"incident" occurs in the liability section of the OPA. In other words,
a polluting party with no defense to liability can utilize this holding
in an attempt to escape from or narrow its liability for damages.'
It is not difficult to imagine the government urging a broader
definition of "incident" under a scenario in which a party is called
upon to pay damages rather than receive compensation for them.
What is striking about the Fourth Circuit's holding is that courts
interpreting various aspects of OPA liability have almost
universally read the text broadly.' These cases are therefore
instructive in determining whether Gatlin's interpretation of
"incident" was reasonable.
A good example of an OPA issue that has been vigorously
contested is whether section 2702 "removal costs" include Coast
Guard monitoring costs. 10 2 The debate centers on the fact that
98. Admittedly, the Congressmen may have written the letters for the purely political
motive of helping a constituent. While this possibility exists, Gatlin was a small business
owner with arguably limited political clout; furthermore, both Congressmen had ties to
OPA's passage (Congressmen Jones through his father), which supports the argument that
their letters indicate their true beliefs concerning the legislative intent in passing the OPA.
99. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Bois D' Arc Operating Corp., No. 98-157,1999 WL 130635,
at * 4 (E.D. La. Mar. 10, 1999) ("In light of the legislative history and congressional intent,
the liability provisions of the OPA... should be read as broadly as the plain language
allows."(emphasis added)).
102. See, e.g., United States v. HyundaiMerchantMarine Co., 172 F.3d 1187,1189-90 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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removal costs, as defined in the Act,' do not expressly include the
costs incurred by the Coast Guard to monitor a discharging party
that undertakes cleanup operations without Coast Guard assist-
ance.1"4 This narrow view of what constitutes removal costs has not
fared well in the courts. For example, in United States v. Conoco,
Inc.,"0 5 the court noted that Conoco's strict reliance on the Act's
definition of "removal" in an attempt to avoid paying Coast Guard
monitoring costs was "too strained."0" In upholding the Coast
Guard's ability to collect these costs, the court referred to the
legislative history and noted that "[t]he OPA... increased potential
liabilities of responsible parties and significantly broadened
financial responsibility requirements."0 7 In United States v.
Murphy Exploration and Production Co.,08 the court adopted the
reasoning of Conoco, and specifically noted that although the OPA
"is not a 'model of clarity" its reference to the FWPCA "is inclusive,
rather than exclusive of monitoring costs."0 9
Based on statutory interpretation, however, the absence of
monitoring costs in the OPA definition for "removal costs" may
indicate that they are not recoverable under OPA." Furthermore,
the statute's explicit reference to monitoring costs in another
section of the Act (section 2712, Uses of the Fund) arguably
indicates that its omission from the liability provision is
intentional."' Despite the potential ambiguity, courts no longer
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
104. See United States v. Conoco, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 581, 583 (E.D. La. 1996).
105. 916 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. La. 1996).
106. See id. at 583.
107. Id. at 585.
108. 939 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. La. 1996).
109. Id. at 491 (quoting Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 583). OPA cross-references the FWPCA
formonitoring costs; the fact that monitoring costs are specifically mentioned inFWPCA and
omitted from the OPA did not sway the court.
110. See United States v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., Civ. No. 94-6176-HO, 1995 WL 84193,
at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 20, 1995) ("Where a statute designates certain... manners of operation,
there is a presumption that omissions are exclusions ('expressio unius est exlusius alerius)."
(quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1991))). See generally Sergio
J. Alarcorn & Flynn M. Jennings, Monitoring Costs Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A
Blank Check for the Coast Guard?, 21 TuL. MAP. L.J. 419 (1997) (arguing that it is not clear
that monitoring costs are included in OPA"removal costs").
111. See Immigration and Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,432
([Wihere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
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question the recovery of monitoring costs." 2 The universal accept-
ance of monitoring costs under OPA provides a good example of
broad judicial interpretation of the Act's liability provisions.
Another example of judicial interpretation of section 2702
liability occurred in United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine
Co.,"' which dealt with the definition of "incident," the same
language at issue in Gatlin. One aspect of the suit concerned the
liability of Hyundai, the OPA responsible party, for the salaries of
Coast Guard personnel who monitored Hyundai's cleanup
operations after a spill. 4 Hyundai argued that the salaries were
"not a cost that 'results from' the incident," because the government
would incur these costs regardless of whether an oil spill
occurred." 5 The court rejected this argument and noted that "[i]f
personnel must be sent to monitor a potential spill, they must be
paid.""6 In other words, the court implicitly avoided a narrow
interpretation of "incident" in the OPA liability provision, which
would have benefited the polluting party.
It is at least debatable whether the salaries are part of the OPA
"incident," because the fact remains that whether the Coast Guard
personnel sat in port or monitored Hyundai's cleanup operations,
their salary is an expense to the government. Even though the
statute does not expressly mention monitoring costs in the
definition of "removal costs," Hyundai awarded the government not
only the costs of monitoring the spill (presumably fuel for the ship
and equipment costs), but also the salaries of all the personnel
involved." 7 In essence, the court refused to narrowly construe
"incident" to limit the costs recovered by the government.
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'(citation omitted)).
112. See United States v. J.R. Nelson Vessel, Ltd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 172, 176 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) ("[D]efendants also complain about the inclusion of the costs of the Coast Guard's
monitoring of the cleanup as an element of damages, but they are clearly recoverable under
OPA.").
113. 172 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1999).
114. See id. at 1192.
115. I& (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)). Obviously, the court was not hung up on the
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Another example of broad judicial interpretation of OPA liability
provisions is the landward expansion of OPA liability."' InAvitts
v. Amoco Production Co., the court faced an OPA claim from an
oil spill that occurred in a Texas oil field. In determining whether
the OPA applied to the spill, the court rejected the defendant's
"unduly narrow interpretation of the Act."" ° The defendant's
argument was that although two creeks crossed the oil fields, they
were not "navigable" within the meaning of OPA."2 The court
utilized broad language in holding that the OPA did apply to the
spill:
While the Act specifically provides for the liability of shore-
based facility owners to the owners of real property damaged by
the facilities' pollutants, nowhere does it indicate a requirement
that either the facility or the property be located adjacent to, or
even near to, navigable waters. Rather, the only minimum
nexus an incident must have to the coastline is that the facility
"poses the substantial threat of discharge of oil, into or upon the
navigable waters or adjoining shorelines."22
The distinction from Gatlin is critical: in Avitts, the court held
that in order to attach OPA liability, the facility must pose a threat
of discharge of oil into navigable waters." Because oil actually did
reach navigable waters in Gatlin,"2 the facility obviously posed a
threat of discharge into navigable waters, and, therefore, any oil
spilled (and corresponding damages) would be covered under the
OPA. Under the reasoning of Gatlin, that an oil spill can be divided
into OPA and non-OPA components, 2 ' the incident determined
118. See Francis J. Gonynor, Six Years Before the Mast: The Evolution of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 105, 136-39 (1996).
119. 840 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. Tex. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 53 F.3d 690 (5th Cir.
1995).
120. Id. at 1122.
121. See id. For an example of a court accepting the argument that waters need not be
"navigable" for OPA liability to attach, see United States v. Mizhir, 106 F. Supp. 2d 124, 125
(D. Mass. 2000).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. See id.
124. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
125. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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OPA liability, and therefore only a portion of the oil discharged
from Gatlin's facility was covered by the provisions of the OPA.
Another example of the landward expansion of OPA occurred in
Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Conewago Contractors, Inc. 6 In determining
the scope of "navigable waters" within OPA, the court concluded
that "[w]hile the discharge, or threat of discharge, need not take
place in or on a covered body of water, there must be some threat
that the oil will make its way into protected areas. " ' The court
ultimately granted the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to
plead an OPA violation in connection with an oil spill on a golf
course."m
Again, the spill in Gatlin did reach navigable waters, as
determined by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. 9 If some oil
reaches navigable waters, then the entire spill, if taken as a single
event, poses a threat of reaching navigable waters. Therefore, under
the holding in Sun Pipe Line, all of the spill in Gatlin would qualify
as a "substantial threat" of discharge into navigable waters under
OPA.
Admittedly, the quoted language from Sun Pipe Line is
susceptible to Gatlin's severability analysis:3 0 only the oil that
actually threatens navigable waters is covered by the OPA.
Consider, for example, a large spill from a facility on a hill. If 100
gallons runs down the hill and into ditches near a river, under the
severability analysis, those 100 gallons pose a "substantial threat"
of discharge into that river. The oil that did not run down the hill
does not pose a threat.''
126. No. 4:CV-93-1995, 1994 WL 539326 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1994).
127. Id. at *12.
128. See id. at *14; see also United States v. Mizhir, 106 F. Supp. 2d 124, 125 (D. Mass.
2000) (accepting a broad definition of "waters of the United States" for purposes of OPA
liability); cf infra note 134.
129. See supra note 64.
130. "Severability analysis" simply refers to Gatlin's use of the word "incident" to divide
the oil spill into two components: the portion of the spill that caused the fire yet never
approached the nearby ditches and river, and the portion of the spill that did approach the
ditches and river (the OPA incident). See Gatlin Oil Co.v. United States, 169 F.3d 207,210-
11 (4th Cir. 1999).
131. For a brief argument supporting what I refer to as the "severing" of an OPA incident,
see Timothy Semenaro, Note, To Be an "Incident" or Not an "Incident," That Is the Question
Under the Oil PollutionAct of 1990: Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States Revisited, 24 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 955, 966-67 (2000), who notes "the Fund is designed to address only the elements of an
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It seems unlikely that Sun Pipe Line is susceptible to Gatlin's
severing of "incident," however, because the court refers to
expansive interpretations under the OPA liability provisions,
including the broad provision quoted fromAvitts.3 2 As noted above,
Avitts indicated that a facility must pose a substantial threat of
discharge for OPA liability to attach;' 3 Sun Pipe Line's favorable
reference to this interpretation indicates its support for a broad
reading of liability provisions under the Act. In other words, an
expansive interpretation of "navigable waters,"34 is inconsistent
with a narrow reading of "incident," a closely related liability
provision. 3
5
Finally, the court in In re Cleveland Tankers' dealt with
damages resulting from an OPA-related oil spill. 37 The essential
facts were as follows: a vessel owned by Cleveland Tankers was
unloading gasoline at a dock when an explosion occurred, causing
the vessel to break from its mooring and partially sink in the
river.' In ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court
oil spill that directly affect or threaten to affect navigable waters."
132. See Sun Pipe Line, 1994 WL 539326 at *2-3 (quoting the broad language of Avitts
extensively); cf Gonynor, supra note 118, at 139 ("Reviewing the Sun Pipeline and Avitts
decisions, it seems that the courts may indeed fashion the application of OPA'90 to facilities
located many miles inland.").
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
134. Abroad reading of "navigable waters" is consistent with regulations promulgated by
the Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act (CWA). See United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985) (noting that "the Corps issued
interim final regulations redefining 'the waters of the United States' to include not only
actually navigable waters but also tributaries of such waters, interstate waters and their
tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate
commerce"). Courts facing CWA claims also read"navigable waters" broadly. See, e.g., Leslie
Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Congress intended to create a
very broad grant of jurisdiction in the Clean Water Act, extending to any aquatic features
within the reach of the commerce clause power."); Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126,
129 (10th Cir. 1985) ("It is the intent of the Clean Water Act to cover, as much as possible,
all waters of the United States instead of just some.").
135. Congress's intent to cover expansively bodies of water under the CWA supports
reading "incident" under OPA broadly, so as to bring more accidents within the scope of
OPA's liability provisions. See supra note 134.
136. 791 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
137. See id. at 671.
138. See id.
1914
A MYOPIC VIEW OF OPA LIABILITY
refused to dismiss OPA claims that were based on the "allegation
of physical injury, [and] smoke damage, to [plaintiffs] facilities.""3 9
Gatlin downplayed this ruling as not pertinent because "the
marina did not seek compensation from the Fund. At most, all that
can be gleaned from the case is that the marina's claim against the
shipowner was not dismissed."' This is an extremely narrow view
of the case.' By denying the motion to dismiss, Cleveland Tankers
implicitly acknowledged that the claim for smoke damage was a
potential cause of action as a matter of law. Even if the plaintiff
ultimately lost on the facts, the claim still proceeded to trial.'
Under Gatlin's definition of "such incident," the smoke damage
claim would not have proceeded because it was collateral to the
discharge of oil into navigable waters, not a direct result of the
discharge into navigable waters. In other words, the smoke damage
did not directly result from oil in the water or a substantial threat
of discharge of oil into the water.
Interestingly, Gatlin also distinguished its facts from Cleveland
Tankers because the polluter in Gatlin was making a claim against
the Fund rather than a private party.' Gatlin based its holding on
the liability provision of OPA, however, which is the same provision
at issue for the smoke damage in Cleveland Tankers. ' Nothing in
the statute's language supports the practice of utilizing differing
interpretations of the liability provision based on the parties' intent
in relying on that provision.' As discussed below, a court wishing
to limit recovery from the Fund may do so through a narrow
reading of OPA liability defenses.'46
It is worth noting that the analysis of smoke damage in
Cleveland Tankers was brief and the holding should not be given
139. Id. at 679 n.8 (emphasis added).
140. Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207,212 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
141. Although the case involved a motion to dismiss, its holding has been recognized as
relevant to OPA liability. See Gonynor, supra note 118, at 127-28 ("The court felt [the smoke
damage] was a physical touching of the plaintiff's property in a tortious manner as allowed
by OPA'90....-).
142. But see Semenaro, supra note 131, at 967 (arguing that although the court in
Cleveland Tankers did not dismiss the claims for smoke damages, it did not "otherwise
address the claims" and therefore "Gatlin's reliance on Cleveland Tankers was misplaced").
143. See Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 212.
144. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
145. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
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too much weight in deciding OPA liability."7 When the case is
compared with the numerous other OPA decisions, however, it
further illustrates the narrow stance taken in Gatlin.
These collective holdings indicate that courts deciding OPA
liability cases take an expansive view of the statute's liability
language. On the surface, the holding of Gatlin is consistent with
all of these decisions: the polluting party finds no sympathy in the
courts. Gatlin's outcome is thus consistent with the notion that the
"polluter pays." But, as noted above, the court relied on a narrow
interpretation of language in the liability provision in its holding,148
which places it at odds with the majority of OPA holdings." 9 The
147. Most of the discussion in Cleveland Tankers dealt with the motion to dismiss
economic loss claims brought under maritime law. See In re Cleveland Tankers, 791 F. Supp.
669 (E.D. Mich. 1992). Also noteworthy is that the court took a restrictive view on the
remainder of the plaintiffs' OPA claims under section 2702 for subsistence use (2702(b)(2)(c)),
and profits and earning capacity (2702(bX2)(E)). See id. at 678-79. The court's holding on
these issues, however, suffers from the same problem as the holding in Gatlin: an overly
narrow interpretation. Thus far, there are no reported cases following the [subsistence use
and profits and earning capacity] holding of Cleveland Tankers. Arguably, the reasoning
behind the decision contradicts OPA '90's legislative history." Gonynor, supra note 118, at
128. Although Gonynor goes on to note that the disputed reasoning is defensible, see id., the
argument proposed in this Note suggests otherwise.
148. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., South Port Marine, LLC. v. Gulf Oil Ltd. Partnership, 73 F. Supp. 2d 17,19
(D. Me. 1999) (refusing to adopt the interpretation of OPA liability proffered by the defense
because the court "[saw] no basis in the statutory language for the defendants' narrow
reading"),affd inpart, rev'd inpart, Nos. 99-2369,99-2370,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31178(1st
Cir. Dec. 7,2000). The decision in South PortMarine is a good example because the polluter
was held liable as a matter of law for both the tangible and intangible assets (i.e., economic
loss) of the plaintiffs following an oil spill under section 2702(b)(2)(B); in other words, the
"polluter paid," but through an expansive, rather than narrow, reading of OPA liability.
Although the court reduced the defendant's liability based on the underlyingfacts of the case,
the legal principle is consistent with the liability interpretation of other OPA cases.
It is worth noting that the appellate court declined to support a universal expansive
reading of OPA provisions:
[W]e think it necessary to address plaintiff's contention that the OPA should
be construed more liberally because it was enacted for the purposes of
benefitting the victims of oil pollution and punishing its perpetrators. While we
agree that such intentions were Congress's principal motivation in enactingthe
OPA, we think it would be naive to adopt to simpleminded a view of
congressional policymaking in light of the competing interests addressed by the
Act.
Id. at *20-21. Interestingly, the court evoked this language in reversing the portion of the
district court ruling that limited damages awarded to the plaintiff. See id. at *22-26.
Although the First Circuit's dicta appears to cut against the argument proposed in this Note,
this Note does not propose a universal pro-plaintiff interpretation of OPA Provisions. It
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fact that Gatlin involved a claim for compensation from the Trust
Fund does not justify the Fourth Circuit's narrow reading of OPA
liability provisions in comparison to other OPA holdings. Under the
Act, a party with a complete defense to liability "is not liable for
removal costs or damages under section 2702 of th[e OPA] title."150
Once a complete defense is established, the party escapes all
liability as it is defined in the liability provision of the OPA
Therefore, whether a party has a defense to liability, or has no
defense due to its negligence in causing a spill, the liability analysis
is exactly the same. For this reason, even a court dealing with a
successful defense to liability should not read the liability provision
narrowly in order to deny recovery from the Trust Fund.
Furthermore, because the defenses to OPA liability are so
difficult to meet, 1 1 a consistent, broad reading of OPA liability
is unlikely to open a "floodgate" of successful Trust Fund com-
pensation claims. 52 In sum, it is better to allow one polluter to
proposes a consistent broad reading ofliability provisions, which does best serve the purpose
behind the OPA. See, e.g., supra note 101. A consistent, broad reading of the liability
provisions by the courts increases a polluter's incentive to commence cleanup operations in
an effort to reduce exposure to collateral damages associated with an oil spill. See supra note
44; supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text; see also Unocal Corp. v. United States, 222
F.3d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant's narrow interpretation of "responsible
party" and noting that to do so "flies in the face of the goals of OPA. The purpose of OPA...
was to encourage rapid private party responses"(quoting Metlife Capital Corp. v. NN Emily
S., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir. 1997))). For an example of a polluter refusing to commence
cleanup operations due to its belief that it was not liabile for the spill, see United States v.
Mizhir, 106 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D. Mass. 2000).
150. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1994).
151. See, e.g., infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
proving no contract exists between polluting party and OPA responsible party). Based on a
LEXIS search, Gatlin is the only successful defense to OPA liability that I found.
152. But see Semanaro, supra note 131, at 968 ("Applying the [Gatlin] dissent's rationale,
in the event that a large quantity of oil is discharged with only a slight fraction making its
way into navigable waters, the entire amount of oil and resulting damages could be
chargeable to the Fund."). Semanaro's analysis fails to consider that this would occur only
if a polluter has a complete defense to liability-a rarity, at best. See supra note 151. In the
overwhelming majority of cases in which a polluter has no defense to liability, the broad
interpretation of liability proffered by the dissent gives the government a tool to collect for
a spill in which only a portion reaches navigable waters. Focusing only on the one-in-a-
million polluter with a statutory defense to liability overlooks the numerous polluters that
would escape liability due to a narrow interpretation of OPA liability provisions.
Yet Semanaro does make a strong point: even if a polluter fails to shift its entire damage
costs to the Trust Fund, its damages under OPA are capped. See supra note 56 and
accompanyingtext. Underabroad interpretation of"incident," apolluter's damages increase;
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collect damages, 53 rather than to produce a holding that will
potentially allow dozens of polluters to escape liability completely.
Causation Analysis
Another particularly troubling aspect of the Fourth Circuit's
holding is that it denied Gatlin's right to compensation from the
Trust Fund for fire damage "als a matter of law," because "the
evidence did not establish that the fire caused the discharge of oil
into navigable waters or posed a substantial threat to do so.""l
Although there must clearly be a causal relationship between
the oil spill and compensable damages under the Act,'55 this
interpretation severely limits the liability provision of the OPA.15 6
if damages exceed the cap on OPA liability, the polluter may assert a claim against the Trust
Fund for the remaining removal costs and damages. See supra note 58 and accompanying
text. "Severing" the incident, see supra note 130, reduces the likelihood of a polluter
collecting from the fund. See Semanaro, supra note 131, at 968.
This is a potential problem with my analysis. Yet, it seems there are at least three
rejoinders to Semanaro's argument. First, a broad interpretation of 'incidene reduces a
polluter's incentive to delay cleanup procedures for portions of a spill it believes won't be
subject to OPA liability. See discussion, supra note 149. One of Congress's main goals in
passing OPA was to increase rapid private-party responses to a spill. See Unocal Corp., 222
F.3d at 535. Second, OPA does not cap damages set by state authorities, nor does it allow
collection from the Trust Fund for cleanup operations designated by state authorities, unless
the Fund is obligated to do so by the President. See supra note 59 and accompanying text;
infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. Thus, much of the costs associated with cleanup
(those designated by state officials) will not be recovered from the Fund. Third, the Trust
Fund is financed by a tax on petroleum products entering into the United States. See supra
note 61 and accompanying text. Thus, consumers ultimately finance any increase in Trust
Fund compensation to polluters. It is not unreasonable for consumers to help pay for the
negative externalities associated with their consumption.
153. The real and personal property damages claimed by Gatlin totaled $ 394,476.00. See
Reply Brief for Appellants at 9, Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999)
(No. 97-2079). Accepting Gatlin's damage claims as a matter of law, of course, does not mean
that the court must a fortiori accept his estimates without a determination of their reason-
ableness.
154. Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 212 (emphasis added).
155. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-94, at 10 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 732
("While the Fund must require some evidence of loss and the establishment of a causal
connection with oil pollution, it should not routinely contest or delay the settlement of
damage claims.").
156. Interestingly, at an earlierpoint in the opinion, the court concluded that Gatlin could
not receive compensation for its damages from the LiabilityTrust Fund because the removal
costs and damages specified in section 2702(b) are those that result from a discharge of oil
or from a substantial threat of a discharge of oiL" Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 211 (emphasis added).
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For example, consider the scenario of an oil tanker hitting a reef
just off the coast of a popular vacation destination. Assume the
tanker requires assistance to empty its tanks so that its cargo of oil
does not spill into the ocean. If the accident is covered on the news
and tourists choose to avoid the resort because of the event, the loss
of tourism dollars is likely a "damage" that the resort owners could
collect from the tanker's owner or operator because of the
"substantial threat of discharge" of oil into navigable waters that
resulted from the accident."5 7 Under the Gatlin causation analysis,
however, the news coverage of the event did not "cause" the
discharge of oil into navigable waters (or the substantial threat of
such a discharge), and the resulting loss of tourism dollars is not
compensable under the OPA.l"
This causation analysis is unfortunate because it compounds the
court's narrow analysis of an OPA "incident" and it also may be
used by polluting parties to escape liability; none of the liability
decisions discussed above would pass this causation requirement.
For example, Coast Guard monitoring costs do not "cause" a
discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil into navigable
waters (nor do the coast personnel salaries) 9 ; smoke damage to
property is susceptible to a similar analogy.
Judicial Interpretation of Defense Provisions
Rather than limit compensation under the Trust Fund through
narrow constructions of OPA liability provisions, courts should
This is less onerous than the requirement that the cause of the damages, in this case the fire,
must also be the cause of the discharge or threat of discharge.
157. This is a scenario used by the Government in its briefto indicate a clear case ofwhen
damages are compensable under the OPA. See Brief for Appellants U.S. Department of
Transportation at 36, Gatlin, 207 F.3d at 207 (No. 97-2079); see also Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc.
v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235 (11th Cir. 1995). InBoca Ciega, the plaintiffs brought
a claim for damages against a responsible partyfor the loss oftourism dollars resulting from
an oil spill. See id at 236. The suit ultimately was dismissed for failure to follow OPA
procedural requirements. See i. at 236,240.
158. In other words, the fire in Gatlin caused the property damage, not the discharge or
threat of discharge; in the posited scenario, the news coverage caused the loss of tourism
dollars, not the discharge or threat of discharge.
159. Although the quoted provision in Gatlin dealt with damages, the narrow inter-
pretation discussed applies to "removal costs," since they bear the same relationship as
"damages" to an OPA "incident." See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994).
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focus instead on the defenses to liability in section 2703 of OPA. A
party is liable under the Act unless one of these defenses is met,
so, a fortiori, if a court does not find that a polluter met the
requirements for a defense to liability, that party must pay for
removal costs and damages under the Act.
International Marine Carriers v. Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund'60
is a good example of a court following this principle in dealing with
a responsible party's claim of an absolute defense to liability under
section 2703(a)(3).' 6' The responsible party (USNS Sealift Atlantic)
was receiving bunker fuel from a terminal in the Houston ship
channel when, through the negligence of the terminal, twelve
barrels of fuel spilled into the channel. 6 2 International Marine
Carriers (IMC), the corporation which operated the ship, followed
OPA cleanup procedures and then filed a claim against the Fund for
oil removal costs. 16 3 The Fund denied the claim because it held that
IMC failed to qualify for a defense to liability under 2703.'
In upholding the Fund's decision, the court reasoned that because
the USNS Sealift Atlantic had executed a Declaration of Inspection
with the terminal, a contract existed between the parties, which
eliminated IMC's defense to liability. 65 OPA precludes a defense
under the Act if "any contractual relationship" exists between the
third party who caused the spill and the OPA responsible party.'6
The court noted that OPA does not define the phrase "any
contractual relationship" and ultimately decided that, based on the
broad interpretation afforded to the term in an analogous Act, the
broader interpretation urged by the government-that a contract
existed-should be adopted as reasonable under the Chevron
doctrine. 67 The court's finding eliminated the IMC's claim for
compensation under the Fund.1 68
160. 903 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
161. See id. at 1104-06.
162. See id. at 1099.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1100.
165. See id. at 1104.
166. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(aX3) (1994).
167. International Marine Carriers, 903 F. Supp. at 1105-06 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b), which deals with third-party defenses under CERCLA). The court noted that under
CERCLA, "e]venan indirect contractual relationship maypreclude the defense."Id. at 1106.
168. See id.
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The existence of a contract, however, was not a straightforward
issue: the defendant asserted that the Declaration was "merely a
pre-bunkering checklist.., not a contract"69 At least one commen-
tator noted the court's interpretation is an expansive view of
contractual relationships under the Act.170 The important feature
of this decision is that it demonstrates that a key judicial tool to
limiting compensation under the Fund lies in a court's
interpretation of the language in section 2703.17 -
Finding "contractual relationships" exist between parties is just
one possibility for a court to limit defenses under the Act: Because
a party must demonstrate that it "exercised due care with respect
to the oil concerned, taking into consideration... all relevant facts
and circumstances" in order to avoid liability, courts also have the
ability to make a fact-specific inquiry into each defense claim. 17 2 Put
simply, compensation may be denied based on the associated facts
of a case that eliminate a polluter's ability to claim a defense to
liability. By denying compensation in a situation that factually
warrants liability, there is less likelihood of an opinion that sets
inconsistent precedent through a narrow interpretation of section
2702.173
169. Id at 1105.
170. See Gonynor, supra note 118, at 119-20 ("Clearly, the. . . holding offers a broader
definition of 'contractual relationship' between vessel interests and others .... It seems
that a simple safety meeting at sea could be elevated to a contractual negotiation.").
171. Finding the existence of a contract between an OPA liable party and a third party
who negligently caused the spill is a common judicial tool to limit defenses to liability. See,
e.g., United States v. J.R. Nelson Vessel, Ltd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 172, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding that even if a bailee of an OPA liable party was the negligent party, "[a] bailment
is a contractual arrangement," and therefore a defense of third-party negligence "fails as a
matter of law").
172. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3)(A) (1994).
173. For example, taking into consideration the location of the oil tanks that "[sit] just
above sea level between [a] creek and a more northern tributary to [a] river," did Gatlin take
enough precautions against the potential for vandalism? Brief of Appellee at 34, Gatlin Oil
Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-2079). This is the kind of issue a
court should carefully analyze in order to limit unwarranted compensation from the Trust
Fund. Of course, the defenses to liability in the Code exist for a reason and if Gatlin took
reasonable care in light of the relevant circumstances, a court should permit compensation.
See, e.g., infra note 179 and accompanying text.
The appellate court could have easily prevented compensation to Gatlin without resorting
to a narrow reading of OPA liability language. In order to preserve an absolute defense to
liability, OPA requires a discharging party to "provide all reasonable cooperation and
assistance requested by a responsible official in connection with removal activities." 33
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An example of this principle is demonstrated in Grundy Oil Co.
v. United States,' a case involving OPA's precursor, the FWPCA.
Grundy Oil involved a traffic accident between a third party and a
truck owned by the polluting party, resulting in the discharge of oil
into a nearby river.'75 The parties did not dispute that provisions of
the FWPCA applied to the incident; the only question was whether
the polluting party qualified for compensation for the cleanup costs
it incurred. 76 The plaintiff would qualify for compensation if it met
the requirements for a defense under the FWPCA. In this case, the
issue was whether the accident occurred solely due to the neg-
ligence of the third-party driver. The court-undertook a detailed,
fact-specific inquiry to determine if the polluter qualified for the
defense, noting that "[flor the plaintiff to prevail on its claim it
must overcome a heavy burden."
177
The polluting party ultimately prevailed in Grundy Oil, but the
case exhibits a tool that courts may use to deny liability in cases
such as Gatlin: a detailed, factual inquiry into whether the party
qualifies forthe defense. It also demonstrates judicial willingness
to compensate polluters ifthey do meet the high standards required
by pollution act defense provisions."
U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). Despite the Federal On-Scene Coordinator's notice to Gatlin of this
provision, "Mr. Gatlin refused to cooperate with the cleanup, claimingthat since the spill was
not his fault, it was not his responsibility," and even "promis[ed] certain death if [the Coast
Guard pollution response team] didn't Heave]." Brief for Appellants U.S. Department of
Transportation at 7, Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 207 (No. 97-2079). The Fourth Circuit could have
dispatched the issue of a complete defense based on Gatlin's conduct alone.
174. 14 Cl. Ct. 759 (1988).
175. See id. at 759.
176. See id. at 760.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 575 F.2d
839,841-43 (1978) (undertaking detailed analysis ofwhether plaintiffundertook reasonable
care against criminal intruders whose actions led to the discharge ofoil into a nearby creek;
the court ultimately found that reasonable care was taken and plaintiffs qualified for a
defense under the FWPCA).
179. It should be noted that I found only three cases under the FWPCA granting
compensation to polluters under the Act, all them discussed in this Note. In other words, a
consistent, broad reading of liability provisions has not opened the floodgates for polluters
to collect under the FWPCA, which supports the conclusion that Gatlin's interpretation of
the OPA liability provision simililarlywould not lead to voluminous claims against the Fund.
But cf Brief for Appellants U.S. Department of Transportation at 30-31, Gatlin Oil Co. v.
United States, 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-2079) (arguing that Gatlin's
interpretation of OPAliability provisions "leads to absurd results" and that polluting parties
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Another important aspect of the OPA is that parties often face
unlimited liability for polluting waterways under state law.
Allowing a party that qualifies for a complete defense to collect
under the OPA does not mean it escapes liability for the pollution.
For example, section 2718 of OPA specifically provides for state
action against a polluter:
Nothing in this Act... shall:
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the
authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from
imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect
to-
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within
such State .... 'so
The holding in Gatlin demonstrates this fact: even though the
company qualified for an absolute defense under OPA, it still could
not collect from the Trust Fund for "expenditures that were directed
by North Carolina authorities.""8 ' In short, qualifying for a defense
under the federal statute does not mean that a polluter escapes
state liability. It is possible that had the Fourth Circuit applied the
near universal broad reading of OPA liability, the resulting
compensation received by Gatlin Oil would have simply passed
through the company en route to the state coffers.
CONCLUSION
When the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's ruling in
Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, it engaged in an indefensible
departure from the statutory language, legislative history, and
judicial interpretations associated with the liability provisions of
could use this interpretation to collect from the Trust Fund in scenarios that "[o]ne [could]
scarcely imagine that Congress" intended).
180. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994); see also National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran
Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1448 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that the purpose of
section 2718(a) "is to allow the states to impose liability upon oil polluters above the liability
imposed through OPA. Congress wanted to give the states the power to force polluters to
cleanup completely oil spills and to compensate the victims of oil spills, even if their liability
for these remediation expenses is limited under OPA).
181. Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 213.
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the OPA. The court, consistent with Congress's intent to punish
oil polluters, rendered a holding that made the polluter pay.
Unfortunately, the court also created precedent that will allow
future polluting parties to escape liability under the OPA. Yet, the
court's ability to construe the language in OPA defense provisions
narrowly provided it with an effective tool to analyze Gatlin's claim
against the OPA Trust Fund, without generating a judicial opinion
favorable to polluters. Future courts should follow pre-Gatlin
analysis when dealing with OPA compensation claims: read the
OPA liability provisions broadly.
Brian Theodore Holmen
